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INTRODUCTION
Like many consensual relationships that fit into a recognizable
legal category, employment relationships are far from identical in
their specifics. For example, within a business firm, although both the
CEO and the lowest-paid employee doing routinized work are employees, the differences between them are compelling evidence of the heterogeneity within “employment” as a category. For many business
firms, the CEO is understood as the firm’s most visible embodiment
by third-party observers as well as by fellow employees situated on
lower ranks of the firm’s internal hierarchy.1 In contrast, many of the
firm’s employees, however essential to its operations, are invisible to
externally situated third parties and, depending on the firm’s size and
† David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I served as the
Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006) and as an Adviser to the Restatement of Employment Law. Many thanks to Andrew Tuch for comments on an earlier
draft.
1
Ira Bashkow, Afterword: What Kind of a Person is the Corporation?, 37 POL. & LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 296, 304 (2014) (stating that the CEO is “the most readily identifiable
source of its personality, while serving as its public face in high-profile contexts”).
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organizational structure, to most fellow employees as well. Additionally, although a firm’s employees share a common employer, the nature of their work spans a broad spectrum, ranging from
responsibilities that necessarily involve exercising substantial discretion to closely monitored and highly specified tasks. Whether an employee manages the work of others distinguishes among categories of
employees but does not necessarily correlate with either an employee’s perceived importance to the firm’s business revenues or the
employee’s relative level of compensation.2 Additionally, employees
vary in the type and extent of knowledge they possess, whether about
the firm itself or otherwise material to its operations. Employees differ as well in their relative capacity to injure their employer, including
through conduct that leads to adverse legal consequences. Some employment relationships exemplify mutual trust; others exemplify relationships between mutually wary parties.
Given these variations (and many others) in the characteristics of
individual employment relationships, the intellectual and normative
gist of employment law as a whole seems elusive. Employment law
may also seem to lack the generalized principles that organize settled
bodies of common law—such as tort, agency, and contract law—or
that structure long-established fields in which statutes occupy a central
presence, such as the law of business associations and trust law. A
particular challenge for employment law as a subject, as this Essay argues, is to articulate the nature and origin of duties that employees
owe their employers. For starters, is employment law itself the basis of
employees’ duties or is it best understood as a contextually useful collection of duties that stem from other sources such as contract,
agency, and tort law, as well as from statutes?3 Relatedly, are the duties applicable to employees amenable to coherent generalization, or
do they vary too much across the undeniably wide range of
employment relationships?4 Answers to these questions matter be2
The significance of nonmanagerial personnel to firm revenue is especially noticeable in portions of the financial services industry. See, e.g., Stephen Grocer & Aaron
Lucchetti, Traders Beat Wall Street CEOs in Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2010, at C1 (detailing
constraints on executive pay in contrast to the structure and magnitude of traders’
remuneration).
3
For example, employment law has been characterized as consisting of “a mosaic of
federal and nonpreempted state statutes laid over a range of common-law agency, tort, and
contract doctrine relevant to the employment relationship,” while the modern employment relationship is “governed by a matrix of sometimes overlapping federal and state
statutes, and state common-law doctrine . . . .” Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General
Common Law for Employment in an Age of Statutes, 100 CORNELL L. REV 1281, 1288, 1297
(2015). Of course, a mosaic, like a matrix, has a meaningful existence as a constructed
object distinct from its individual raw-material components.
4
Whether agency law is either intellectually coherent or distinctive continues to be
debated. As I have written elsewhere, earlier scholarship about the subject in the United
States was daunted by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s critique characterizing the subject as a
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cause they structure inquiry into how the law should apply to facts not
yet addressed by a controlling precedent and because they furnish a
starting point to critique such precedents.
This Essay focuses on one troublesome question: whether, under
what circumstances, or to what degree employees owe a fiduciary duty
of loyalty to an employer. One answer, adopted by some courts and
by the Restatement (Third) of Agency (Agency Restatement), characterizes all employees as agents and thus subjects them all to a fiduciary
duty of loyalty, albeit coupled with the cautionary insight that the
duty, highly contextual in what it requires, does not impose a monolithic template on the relationships to which it applies.5 Another answer, adopted by some courts and by the Restatement of Employment
Law (the Restatement),6 restricts the applicability of fiduciary duty to
employees within a specified category, which in that Restatement are
employees in relationships of trust and confidence with their employers.7 Choosing between these alternatives presents a dilemma because
each alternative carries practical and theoretical implications, plus a
distinctive set of strengths and limitations.
In particular, if all employees are deemed to be agents, the work
done by many will lack implications that seem meaningfully connected to the law of agency. This is because many employees’ work
does not involve transacting or otherwise interacting with third parties
collection of anomalous results that were inexplicable through conventional applications
of other subjects’ legal principles, which did not make agency itself sufficiently coherent to
be a “proper title in the law.” See Deborah A. DeMott, The Contours and Composition of
Agency Doctrine: Perspectives from History and Theory on Inherent Agency Power, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1813, 1817–18 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 345
(1891)). Responses to Holmes took different forms, but debate over the status of agency
law continues. See id. at 1815 n.5, 1832–33.
5
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (characterizing employment
categorically as a relationship of agency); id. § 8.01 cmt. c (observing that “[f]iduciary obligation, although a general concept, is not monolithic in its operation”). For the underlying proposition that fiduciary obligation is a constitutive element of an agency
relationship, see id. § 1.01 (defining agency as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when
one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act”). One implication is that an actor who
owes no duty of loyalty is not an agent. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67
(2013).
6
This was formerly known as the “Restatement (Third) of Employment Law”; its new
title reflects the fact that it was not preceded by earlier Restatements of the subject. The
published text of the Proposed Final Draft [hereinafter “Proposed Final Draft”] uses the
“Restatement (Third)” title. This Essay notes changes to the Restatement text occurring
after publication of the Proposed Final Draft with references to the “final text” (2015).
7
Depending on the circumstances, employees not within this category may owe “an
implied contractual duty of loyalty to the employer in matters related to their employment.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(a) (2015). The prototypical example of a “nonfiduciary” employee subject to an implied contractual duty of loyalty is an employee who
“come[s] into possession of [his or her] employer’s trade secrets.” See id. § 8.01 cmt. a.
For discussion of implied contractual duties of loyalty, see infra text accompanying note 96.
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external to the employer’s organization. Moreover, employers may be
tempted to respond to wrongful-termination suits brought by former
employees with counterclaims asserting a breach of fiduciary duty allegedly committed by the employee, particularly when the now-former
employee has joined or formed a competing business. Such counterclaims are troubling when the sole basis for any allegation of disloyal
conduct is the fact that the employee, having departed, repositioned
himself or herself as or within a competitor, using no means that are
themselves wrongful. If the prospects of such a counterclaim deter
the assertion of meritorious claims of wrongful termination, characterizing all employees as fiduciaries seems problematic. However, if
only employees in positions of trust and confidence are subject to fiduciary duties of loyalty, employers may respond with private-ordering
solutions. That is, employers may deploy individual agreements that
explicitly characterize many members of the work force as having relationships of trust and confidence with the employer.8 At the least,
attempts to contractualize such a fiduciary duty raise questions about
the construction and application of contract terms. Contractualized
solutions may also risk underinclusiveness—that is, omit situations in
which a duty of loyalty should apply. And, unlike the Agency Restatement, the Restatement does not address in general terms the significance of language that characterizes a relationship, whether
contained in separate agreements with individual employees or in a
statement unilaterally issued by the employer.9
Separately, to begin fiduciary-duty analysis with the concepts and
vocabulary of relationships of trust and confidence (as the Restatement does10) may prove an awkward fit, at least initially, with developed jurisprudence. This is because fiduciary-duty analysis usually
proceeds categorically, while examining the factual specifics of trust
and confidence in particular situations proceeds only in marginal or
fringe situations that are not categorized as fiduciary.11 Overall, the
cases applying trust-and-confidence formulations turn on fact-specific
inquiries that are structured against a backdrop of settled fiduciary
categories with characteristics that serve as analogies and benchmarks
for these inquiries along their peripheries.
To frame its discussion of fiduciary duties in employment relationships, this Essay opens in Section II with a brief survey of the fiduciary landscape, a metaphorical terrain that includes several contested
features. Section II turns to fiduciary duties of loyalty in the context
8
For the implications of statements in employer-issued handbooks that purport to
impose duties on employees, see infra text accompanying note 125.
9
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 cmt. b (2006).
10
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(a) (2015) (discussing the duty of loyalty
owed by “[e]mployees in a position of trust and confidence with their employer”).
11
See infra Part I.B.
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of employment relationships, to the alternatives sketched above, and
to the relevant specifics of the Restatement. Section III examines potential implications of the Restatement’s use of relationships of trust
and confidence as the starting point for fiduciary analysis. At a minimum, analysis within the Restatement’s framework should not presuppose a narrowly defined prototype of employees who occupy
relationships of trust and confidence. Returning to this Essay’s initial
examples, relationships of trust and confidence encompass employees
in addition to the occupants of c-level positions in large firms.12 This
Essay concludes by celebrating the Restatement’s completion while
also noting that its answer to whether employees owe fiduciary duties
leaves open several significant questions. Central among these are the
role of contract within employment law and, more generally, the ties
between employment law and other bodies of law.

SURVEYING

THE

I
FIDUCIARY LANDSCAPE

A. Lay Understandings of Fiduciaries
In lay usage and understanding, a fiduciary is an actor whom one
should be able to trust to be loyal to one’s interests.13 Fiduciary relationships stem from or create disparities of power and information,
such that the relationship’s beneficiary14 is or becomes vulnerable to
the actor who occupies the fiduciary role.15 Such relationships require or engender trust by the beneficiary with a correlative potential
for abuse by the fiduciary, often—but not necessarily—effected
12
That is, senior management members with titles beginning with “Chief.” See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “c-level management” as
“[c]ollectively, the officers of an organization holding titles prefixed by ‘chief’; the upper
tier of top management”).
13
Dictionary definitions of “fiduciary” are not identical, of course, but many reflect
the long legacy of the law of trusts. See, e.g., CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 527
(Catherine Soanes & Angus Stevenson eds., 11th ed. 2004) (defining it initially as “[l]aw
involving trust, especially with regard to the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary”); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 528 (Jess Stein & Laurence Urdang eds., 6th ed. 1973) (defining it initially as “a person to whom property or
power is entrusted for the benefit of another”); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, COLLEGE EDITION 539 (10th ed. 1964) (defining it initially as “designating or of a person who
holds something in trust for another”). Definitions in general dictionaries are not so different from the legal dictionary definition. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 743 (10th ed.
2014) (defining it as “[s]omeone who is required to act for the benefit of another person
on all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to another the duties of
good faith, loyalty, due care, and disclosure”).
14
I use this term loosely, not as defined by the law of trusts.
15
See Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 69596 (2015) (quoting Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 157, 161 (2013)) (“At its core, a fiduciary relationship is one in which one party—the
fiduciary—is trusted with power over the interests of another—the beneficiary—who becomes vulnerable as a result.”).
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through deceptive or disingenuous means.16 As a consequence, when
an actor in a fiduciary position acts disloyally or fails to take an action
that loyalty requires, it is justifiable that the beneficiary would feel betrayed, not just disappointed or aggrieved in a generalized way. Indeed, the beneficiary might feel deceived, at least about the fiduciary’s
allegiances and the truth about the beneficiary’s relationship with the
fiduciary.17
Thoughtful lay understandings of fiduciary relations also encompass the specifics of what a duty of loyalty may require. In particular,
deceit by an actor who owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty often consists of
more than affirmative misrepresentations. In a fiduciary role, the actor may deceive through omissions, usually because the other party
trusts the fiduciary to be forthcoming and is justified in feeling betrayed when the fiduciary actor is less than candid or straightforward.18 An example from Collin O’Neil illustrates this point in the
context of an informal, trusting relationship between two people, Bob
and Sue: Bob does not want Sue to know that it was he who spilled
coffee on her laptop.19 Bob does not lie to Sue by telling her either
that he stopped drinking coffee two weeks ago or that her cat knocked
over Bob’s mug of coffee when Bob was out of the room.20 Instead,
Bob dips the cat’s paws in cold coffee so that Sue, when she discovers
both the damaged laptop and the cat’s coffee-stained paws, will draw
her own inference, one that exculpates Bob.21 O’Neil characterizes
Bob’s strategy as an example of “covert deceit” that implicates Sue’s
expectation that Bob is honest and would not trick her into believing
something he does not himself believe.22 To be sure, Bob might have
deceived Sue even if she did not trust him, “[b]ut it remains the case
that the actual opportunity he takes rests on her trust,” which Bob
abused.23 And as it happens, Bob’s conduct, analyzed through the
16
For a representative judicial statement, see In re MF Global Holdings Ltd. Inv. Litig., 998 F. Supp. 2d 157, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A fiduciary relationship arises where one
party’s superior position or superior access to confidential information is so great as virtually to require the other party to repose trust and confidence in the first party, and the
defendant was under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon
matters within the scope of the relation. . . . Broadly stated, a fiduciary relationship is one
founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of
another.” (internal quotations omitted)).
17
For full development of this argument, focused on relationships that invite trust
from the victim, see Collin O’Neil, Lying, Trust, and Gratitude, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 301,
303 (2012).
18
See id. at 308–09 (explaining that a breach of trust gives rise to feelings of betrayal
because it disappoints expectations of the trustee’s good will).
19
O’Neil hypothesizes that this is because Bob does not wish to replace the damaged
laptop, id. at 302, but one might imagine other explanations.
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
See id. at 327.
23
Id.
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framework defined by common-law fraud, may be an example of an
implied misrepresentation made through conduct and, if the relationship between Bob and Sue is characterized as fiduciary or sufficiently
fiduciary-like, as an example of constructive fraud.24
B. Categorical and Ad Hoc Fiduciary Relationships
To be sure, the law applicable to fiduciary relationships is more
complicated than the lay understanding. Its underpinnings are also
the subject of ongoing and vigorous debate among legal scholars.25
Nonetheless, basic features of the fiduciary landscape are not controverted. Most fiduciary relationships “are treated as such as a matter of
status or convention.”26 In the culminating point of accretion and
generalization over a long period of time, certain relationships are
“habitually treated as fiduciary.”27 Well-known examples of habitual
or categorical fiduciary relationships include those between trustees
and beneficiaries, agents and principals, directors and corporations,
lawyers and clients, and guardians and wards, as well as the relationship among partners.28 For other relationships—such as those between parents and children, doctors and patients, and elected officials
and the polity—recognition of the category as fiduciary is either less
settled or more variable across jurisdictions.29
Apart from settled or status-based characterizations, courts impose ad hoc or fact-based fiduciary duties when although the parties’
relationship was not categorically fiduciary, its characteristics nonetheless justified one party’s expectation of loyal conduct from the other.30
For example, in Burdett v. Miller,31 the plaintiff invested in three tax
24
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2014) (stating that fraud can be implied). In any event, a fiduciary’s failure to
disclose material information may result in liability if the fiduciary is under a duty to speak,
i.e., disclose the information. See id. § 13(b); infra text accompanying notes 82–85.
25
Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (describing fiduciary relationships as contractual), with Scott
FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 305 (1999) (arguing fiduciary relationships “arise and function in ways alien to contractualist thought”).
26
Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 1, 2 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS).
27
Id. at 2–3.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936 (2006). An alternate formulation, using the
vocabulary of economic analyses of fiduciary law, characterizes ad hoc fiduciary relationships as ones typified by the presence of “an agency problem”—that is, the possession by
one party of “difficult-to-observe discretionary power affecting” the other party’s welfare.
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 26, at 197–201.
31
957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992).
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shelters recommended by an accountant whom the plaintiff befriended when she enrolled in a course he taught.32 Like the fictional
Bob in Collin O’Neil’s hypothetical, the defendant did not explicitly
lie but instead failed to disclose a series of material facts. These included the facts that the first tax shelter he recommended was its
sponsor’s initial venture; the investment units would not be marketable; the plaintiff’s investment would represent a third of the total invested by anyone; and, for a later project, the defendant himself was
the owner of the units he urged the plaintiff to buy.33 But the tax
shelters were worse than worthless: not only did the plaintiff lose her
investment (the shelter promoters, friends of the defendant, absconded to Canada), she was required to make good on the bank letter of credit through which she secured her investment.34 In the
court’s analysis, the defendant solicited the plaintiff’s trust in matters
in which he represented himself to be an expert, “as well as trustworthy”; the plaintiff, not an expert herself, reposed trust in the defendant.35 Additionally, the defendant did nothing to dispel the
fiduciary consequences of his conduct, such as “explaining the character and circumstances of the investments” to the plaintiff, disclosing
his own interests, or assuring that the plaintiff received prospectuses
before she invested.36 Although the defendant did not obtain direct
control over the plaintiff’s wealth, as would a trustee or an investment
manager, he invited her uncritical reliance on him.37
Other examples of the imposition of fact-based fiduciary duties
are consistent with the structure of the court’s analysis in Burdett: the
determinative question is whether one party, having been invited to
do so, “reposed confidence in another and reasonably relied on the
other’s superior expertise or knowledge.”38 Answering the question
requires fact-specific inquiry into the parties’ particular relationship,
an inquiry against a commercial backdrop structured around the general assumption that contractual lender-borrower and debtor-creditor
relationships do not impose fiduciary duties on the lender or
32
Id. at 1378–79. The court’s opinion does not state whether the defendant was a
registered investment adviser. In 1963, the Second Circuit enabled the imposition of a
federal fiduciary duty on advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1963). For a full history and its
implications, see generally Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1056–66, 1080–88 (2011).
33
See Burdett, 957 F.2d at 1379.
34
But the shelters did generate tax benefits for the plaintiff, plus the opportunity to
write off losses from the fraud against her income. See id.
35
Id. at 1381.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 1381–82.
38
Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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creditor.39 Some courts recognize that no bright line divides arm’slength relationships from ones in which a fiduciary duty constrains
one or both parties.40 A central inquiry is whether to characterize the
trust reposed by the victim as, on the one hand, the product of the
victim’s credulity or the defendant’s personality or, on the other
hand, the consequence of the defendant’s position in the transaction,41 comparable to the dominance created by a fiduciary actor’s
role in a habitual fiduciary category like a trustee or an agent.
Informal fiduciary relationships and the terminology of relationships of trust and confidence became more prominent for business
and corporate lawyers following United States v. Chiarella.42 In
Chiarella, a criminal prosecution for insider trading, the Court held
that a “duty to disclose arises when one party has information ‘that the
other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.’”43 Breach of a
duty of disclosure is crucial for insider-trading liability because the relevant statutory provision—Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934—is a general antifraud measure that prohibits the use of
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities contrary to rules adopted by the
SEC.44 A longstanding understanding about trading on the basis of
nonpublic information is that a trader who is an employee of the entity that issued the security owes the issuer a fiduciary duty that prohibits trading without the issuer’s consent.45 Post-Chiarella developments,
in contrast, focus on noninsiders who come to possess inside
information. In 2000, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5–1, which proscribes the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of material nonpublic information by any person “in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence” owed to the issuer of the security, its shareholders, or the
39

See id.
See, e.g., United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1080 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is
not a bright line between formal or informal fiduciary relationships, and run-of-the-mill
commercial relationships.”).
41
Advocare Int’l, LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 695–98 (5th Cir. 2008).
42
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
43
Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
44
That is, in section 10(b), Congress did not specify or define insider trading as conduct that violates the Securities Exchange Act.
45
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (treating an
employee-geologist as a fiduciary); see also 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING:
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 3:5 (2012) (suggesting “no reason to depart”
from assumption that all employees owe duties of loyalty that include an obligation not to
profit from information given in the course of employment; all employees—including a
law firm’s janitor—may have privileged access to inside information, if only through waste
paper). The legal implications of tipping—sharing inside information with others to use
in their trading—are beyond the scope of this Essay.
40
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source of the information.46 More recently, in Skilling v. United
States,47 the Court relied on its earlier formulation in Chiarella in interpreting the federal mail fraud statute, suggesting that both formal and
informal fiduciary relationships are salient in the mail fraud context.48
One reason that the lines demarcating fiduciary relationships are
no brighter is that particular relationships may change over time,
morphing away from arm’s length qualities into those warranting the
application of fiduciary duties, whether as the consequence of entry
into a formal or “habitual” fiduciary relationship or as an occasion for
the fact-specific imposition of fiduciary duties, as in Burdett.49 For example, when a securities broker assumes effective control over a client’s nondiscretionary account, the broker becomes subject to the
fiduciary duties of a discretionary account’s investment manager.50
Indeed, prior to the creation of a formal agency relationship with a
client, a broker in whom the client has already reposed trust and confidence may owe the client a fiduciary duty of disclosure concerning
complicated or obscure terms in the broker’s fee and commission
structure.51 In general, although cases finding ad hoc fiduciary relationships fit into patterns, these patterns of duty imposition have not
46
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(a) (2000). For its history and the SEC’s rationale, see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-7881.htm (last modified Aug. 21, 2000). Rule 10b5–2 includes an expressly
nonexclusive statement of circumstances under which a relationship of trust and confidence exists, including an agreement to maintain information in confidence, a history
between the source of the information and its recipient such that the recipient knows or
reasonably should know that the source expects the information to be kept in confidence,
or receiving information from a close family member unless the recipient can demonstrate
an absence of a reasonable expectation that the information be kept confidential. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5–2 (2000). For the leading case, involving tips by a husband concerning
a major development in his wife’s family’s business, see United States v. Chestman, 941
F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1991).
47
561 U.S. 358, 407 n.41 (2010). In Skilling, the defendant (of Enron notoriety) was
charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud by depriving a corporation and its shareholders whom he served as a senior officer of the intangible right to his honest services in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The Court held that the defendant’s conduct did not violate
the statute because it criminalized only the “bribe-and-kickback core” of cases decided
under a more general statutory formulation that the Court invalidated earlier in McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360–61 (1987). See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409.
48
See United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 723 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United
States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010). In Lupton, a real-estate broker who was
characterized as an “independent contractor” in a contract which engaged him to facilitate
the sale of state-owned properties committed honest-services fraud by soliciting kickbacks
from other brokers in exchange for crunching numbers to assure success of their proposals. Id. at 793–98. The court determined that his contractual designation as an “independent contractor” was not determinative of agency status for criminal-law purposes. Id. at
800–01.
49
See DeMott, supra note 30, at 941 (noting that parties’ dealings over time may form
the basis for a fiduciary duty).
50
See, e.g., Davis v. Keyes, 859 F. Supp. 290, 294 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
51
Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734, 741 (Ill. 1994).
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crystallized into across-the-board principles that are meaningful once
divorced from the contexts in which they originated. On some topics—exemplified by the insider-trading cases—courts analyze questions relevant to the imposition of ad hoc fiduciary duties against a
backdrop dominated by categorically defined fiduciaries, as the law in
that context presupposes to be the case for an issuer’s employees.52
C. The Content of Loyalty
Across the habitual or conventional categories, fiduciary duties
are formally similar and are structured as a general standard or principle along with “specific subsidiary or implementing rules that elaborate on the application of loyalty and care to recurring
circumstances,” in Robert Sitkoff’s formulation.53 For example, an
agent’s specific duties of loyalty prohibit acquiring a “material benefit
from a third party” through use of the agent’s position, including material benefits received in connection with “transactions conducted or
other actions taken on behalf of the principal.”54 Additionally, an
agent may not deal with the principal as an adverse party, or on behalf
of an adverse party, in a transaction connected with the agency relationship;55 nor may an agent compete with the principal or assist the
principal’s competitors during the agency relationship.56 Finally, and
unsurprisingly, an agent’s duty of loyalty proscribes using, whether for
the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party, the principal’s
property or confidential information.57
Agents, like other fiduciaries, also owe duties that do not stem
from the duty of loyalty, although that duty may shape or color how
the agent should discharge nonloyalty duties.58 Conventionally in
some settings, like corporate law, these nonloyalty duties are characterized as duties of “care,” as in Robert Sitkoff’s formulation.59 Thus,
for trustees, the prudent investor rule elaborates how a trustee should
discharge the investment function.60 Comparable duties for agents,
termed duties of performance,61 often originate in any contract that
52
See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980) (discussing fiduciary relationships in the insider-trading context).
53
Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 202 (emphasis omitted).
54
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006).
55
Id. § 8.03.
56
Id. § 8.04.
57
Id. § 8.05.
58
Whether duties that are not duties of loyalty should be characterized as “fiduciary”
is open to dispute. See, e.g., Velasco, supra note 15, at 648 (arguing that stripping fiduciary
duty of nonloyalty components would impoverish it).
59
See Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 201–02.
60
See id.
61
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.07–8.12 (2006). The counterpart duties
were designated “duties of service and obedience” in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
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links principal to agent.62 An agent’s distinctive duties of performance, as defined by any agreement with the principal, require exercising care, competence, and diligence,63 as well as conduct by the agent
that adheres to the scope of the agent’s actual authority and complies
with lawful instructions given by the principal.64 Additionally, an
agent has a duty to use reasonable effort to provide material (and
relevant) information to the principal,65 a duty of performance that is
closely related to the agent’s duties of loyalty. Of course, through disclosure the agent may obtain the principal’s consent to conduct that
would otherwise breach a duty of loyalty, and facts that the agent
knows or learns, if shared with the principal, enable the principal to
make better-informed assessments of its own interests on an ongoing
basis.
Fiduciary duties are often characterized as “default” rules—that
is, ones that the parties may alter.66 But how a duty may be altered
depends on the nature or type of duty. Varying an agent’s duties of
loyalty requires consent from the principal;67 for example, self-dealing
by the agent breaches the agent’s loyalty unless the principal consents.68 Effective consent in this context requires specificity about the
agent’s conduct plus disclosure to the principal of facts material to the
principal’s judgment, unless the principal already knows the facts or
manifests indifference to learning them.69 In sharp contrast, an
agent’s duties of performance (or “care”) may be varied or specified
through agreement with the principal, which does not require either
the particularization or the knowledge that typifies effective consent
to conduct that would otherwise breach an agent’s duties of loyalty.70
Thus, an agreement that defines or varies an agent’s duties of
performance is effective, like a bilateral contract, on an ex ante basis.
But at least in the context of agency relationships, a principal’s purported consent to an agent’s breach of a duty of loyalty is not effective
unless informed by facts pertinent at the time the principal gives
See id. § 8.07 note a. Relatedly, “employees” in the earlier Restatements of Agency were
termed “servants.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
62
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.07 (2006). Although agency is a consensual
relationship, its formation does not require an enforceable contract—or any contract at
all— between principal and agent. See id. § 1.01 cmt. d.
63
Id. § 8.08.
64
Id. § 8.09.
65
Id. § 8.11.
66
See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60
SMU L. REV. 383, 384 (2007).
67
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006).
68
See, e.g., id. § 8.01 cmt. b, illus. 3.
69
Id. § 8.06.
70
See id. § 8.08 (noting the agent’s duties of care, competence, and diligence are
“[s]ubject to any agreement with the principal”).
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consent.71 Nor is hypothetical consent relevant; that is, it is no defense to the agent that the principal would have consented had the
agent made disclosure of material facts, or that a reasonable person in
the principal’s position would have consented, or even that the
agent’s conduct benefitted the principal.72
D. Larger Theoretical Challenges
Beyond these observable features of the law, scholars contest
much within the theoretical realm of the fiduciary landscape, including whether the law applicable to the varieties of fiduciary relationships can be generalized or justified by a set of underlying principles
or concepts. A narrower point of disagreement is whether in some
sense, if only metaphorical, fiduciary duties are best regarded as stemming from contracts, a question with implications for Section III of
this Essay. Many judicial opinions explicitly treat fiduciary obligation
as extracontractual, imposed “as a matter of social policy rather than
by mutual consensus” in the Third Circuit’s formulation.73 However,
an academically influential body of scholarship begins with the assumption that fiduciary duties are not distinctive at all but instead represent a hypothetical type of contractual response when the parties’
real-world contract is incomplete in some respect.74 One difficulty
with the contractualized view is its misfit with some settled characteristics of fiduciary doctrine. For example, as discussed above, in determining whether a principal has consented to conduct by the agent
that would otherwise constitute a breach of the agent’s duty of loyalty,
the law of agency looks to whether the principal in fact consented,
knowing the specifics.75 More generally, as Daniel Markovits observes,
parties to an arm’s-length contract share gains anticipated from trade
ex ante through terms that define rights, typically enforceable
through an expectation measure of damages in the event of breach.76
Parties to a fiduciary relationship share ex post: a fiduciary must take
71
For further elaboration on this distinction and its implications, see generally
Deborah A. DeMott, Defining Agency and Its Scope, in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH
AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg eds., forthcoming 2015),
available at scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6101&context=faculty_
scholarship.
72
See id. (manuscript at 23) (on file with author) (arguing that such a rule would
incentivize agents to breach their duties of loyalty “in the hope that the eventual outcome
would prove advantageous to the principal”).
73
Bohler–Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 105 (3d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations omitted).
74
The most influential early work in this vein is Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 25,
at 438 (“Good faith in contract merges into fiduciary duties . . . .”).
75
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
76
Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 26, at 211 (“Contract law vindicates promisees’ rights through the expectation remedy.”).
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initiative on his or her beneficiary’s behalf and is subject to a duty of
loyalty, termed by one influential court a “‘free-floating’ duty” that is
applied at the time of the wrong.77 And fiduciary law does not entertain the concept of efficient breach, a frequent outcome for relationships defined by arm’s length contracting.78 Indeed, distinctively
fiduciary remedies—the imposition of a constructive trust and an accounting of profits—by design operate ex post the fiduciary’s breach.
Another distinctive feature of the law involving fiduciary relationships that eludes capture by contractualized accounts is the significance of knowledge and how or whether the fiduciary shares it with
the beneficiary.79 A fiduciary may well know more about a beneficiary
(at least about some things) than the beneficiary knows about himself
or herself.80 Many fiduciary duties also create duties to know something and impose duties of disclosure. For example, an agent’s duty
of loyalty prohibits self-dealing unless the principal consents; one
among the suite of an agent’s duties of performance requires making
a reasonable effort to inform the principal of facts material to the
agency relationship.81 The principal’s power of control over the
agent (a constitutive element of any agency relationship82) is facilitated by facts the agent furnishes; these facts often concern the thencurrent state of the world, as opposed to its state as known by the
principal when forming the agency relationship.83 To be effective,
that is, the principal’s mechanisms of control require current information, which enables the principal to furnish the agent with updated
instructions as the situation warrants. And the power to give interim
instructions, a basic element and mechanism of control, is constitutive

77
Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 419 (Del. 2013) (quoting ASB
Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434,
440–42 (Del. Ch. 2012)). Gerber and ASB Allegiance contrast fiduciary duty with the implied
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which looks to the past and what the
parties would have agreed to had they considered the question at the time of contracting.
See id. at 419.
78
Markovits, supra note 76, at 211–13.
79
See Richard R.W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 26, at 225, 229.
80
Id. at 225, 237–38.
81
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006).
82
See id. § 1.01 cmts. c & f; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013).
83
These include facts about the agent—for example, his or her self-dealing. Thus, a
claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is “really the opposite of a misappropriation claim in that it is the agent or employee that withholds information or conceals activity of his [or her] own when the relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose, whereas the
essence of a misappropriation claim is the theft of the employer’s information.” Wysong
Corp. v. M.I. Indus., 412 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623–24 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (alleging that agent,
aided by employee, breached duty of loyalty through nondisclosure of competitive
activity).
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of an agency relationship.84 In short, within the scope of a fiduciary
relationship, a fiduciary’s knowledge is relational, a fact elided by contractualist accounts.85
II
EMPLOYMENT

AND

FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS

Whether all employees owe fiduciary duties to their employer has
not been answered consistently, whether by courts or the Restatements. This section opens by discussing how the Restatement of Employment Law resolves this question, then turns to the definition of
relationships of trust and confidence. These serve as the linchpin in
the Restatement’s imposition of fiduciary duty.
A. The Restatement of Employment Law: The Content of
Fiduciary Duty
The Restatement addresses employees’ duties of loyalty in section
8.01, which differentiates from all other employees those “in a position of trust and confidence” with the employer.86 Employees in a
position of trust and confidence owe their employer “a fiduciary duty
of loyalty . . . in matters related to their employment,”87 which generally has the specific content of an agent’s duties of loyalty but narrowed in one respect. An employee breaches the duty of loyalty by
“competing with the employer while employed,”88 or “misappropriating the employer’s property . . . or otherwise engaging in self-dealing
through the use of the employee’s position with the employer,”89 or
“disclosing or using the employer’s trade secrets . . . for any purpose
adverse to the employer’s interest . . . .”90 The duty not to use or
disclose trade secrets is narrower than an agent’s duties of nonuse and
nondisclosure of the principal’s confidential information, which encompasses information beyond trade secrets,91 a category limited to
84
I have written elsewhere about an agent’s duties in interpreting instructions received from the principal, arguing that the agent’s fiduciary role furnishes a basic benchmark against which the agent should interpret instructions. Deborah A. DeMott, The
Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions, in Philosophical Foundations, supra note 26, at 321.
85
See Brooks, supra note 79, at 229.
86
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(a) (2015).
87
Id.
88
Id. § 8.01(b)(2).
89
Id. § 8.01(b)(3).
90
Id. § 8.01(b)(1).
91
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (2006). However, a comment in the
Restatement refers to “the background rule that allows employers to share trade secrets
and other confidential information with their employees.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.03
cmt. a (2015) (emphasis added). Elsewhere it is made clear that confidential information
that is not a trade secret can be protected only through contract. Id. § 8.02 cmt. a.
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information that “derives independent economic value from being
kept secret.”92 One wonders about information that an employer
treats as confidential and often has a duty to keep confidential, such
as patients’ names and medical histories in hospital records.93 To be
sure, as explored at greater length below, an employer may impose
nonuse and nondisclosure obligations on employees that reach information beyond the trade-secret category.94
Other employees, not in relationships of trust and confidence
with the employer, owe implied contractual duties of loyalty “in matters related to their employment” depending on the nature of the positions they hold.95 Additionally, employees “who come into
possession of the employer’s trade secrets owe a limited fiduciary duty
of loyalty” concerning those secrets.96 Left unexplained is why employee shenanigans in these categories aren’t treated identically—that
is, why wouldn’t it be a breach of the limited-purpose fiduciary duty to
misappropriate an employer’s property, as distinct from disclosing or
using the employer’s trade secrets? If treated as a breach of contract,
would the misappropriation of property entitle the employer to recover any profits gleaned by the employee or to impose a constructive
trust97 over the misappropriated property itself or its proceeds? Both,
of course, are conventional remedies for this type of breach of fiduciary duty, as under appropriate circumstances is replevin.98
92
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.02(a) (2015). An intriguing question, which this
Essay does not explore, is whether the category of trade-secret information overlaps completely with the category of nonpublic material information for securities-law purposes.
93
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2015) (prohibiting disclosure of confidential
health information).
94
See infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
95
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(a) (2015).
96
Id. In the final text, an employee’s possession of trade secrets itself explicitly triggers the imposition of a fiduciary duty of loyalty, albeit one “limited,” presumably in scope,
to matters concerning the secrets. Id. In contrast, in the Proposed Final Draft, a comment
observed only that an employee in possession of an employer’s trade secrets “may become
a fiduciary for a limited purpose.” Proposed Final Draft § 8.01 cmt. a.
97
The Restatement does not mention this well-established remedy for breach of a
fiduciary duty of loyalty. Section 9.09(d) states that “[i]f an employee personally profits
from a breach of fiduciary duty, the employer can recover those profits.” RESTATEMENT OF
EMP’T LAW § 9.09(d) (2015). Perhaps recovery of profits could include recovery of misappropriated property, or property otherwise acquired via a breach of fiduciary duty, but
constructive trusts go unmentioned. On constructive trusts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 (2011). Additionally, the remedial possibility
articulated by Section 9.09(d) is inconsistent with an earlier statement that limits relief for
breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty to situations “causing economic injury to the employer.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 cmt. e (2015).
98
See, e.g., FryeTech, Inc. v. Harris, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1154, 1157 (D. Kan. 1999)
(holding that employer had superior rights in equipment it sought to replevy although
former employees had transferred ownership to another entity; employees took equipment
that employer instructed them to dismantle and scrap to establish own enterprise to compete with employer).
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Perhaps because it specifically targets issues arising in the employment context, the Restatement does not delineate duties of performance (or care) that are counterparts to those discussed above for
agents and other fiduciary actors. Instead, the comment accompanying section 8.01 directs attention to the Agency Restatement for
“other [employee] obligations.”99 This omission is understandable—
it avoids repeating content readily available elsewhere—but it also has
the consequence, whether or not intended, of situating the duty of
loyalty in isolation from complementary duties, including the agencylaw duties to use best efforts to furnish material information to the
principal, to follow lawful instructions, and to use care. The omission
also forestalls discussion of the relationships among these duties. And
the omission may reflect the assumption, central to the treatment of
employees’ duty of loyalty, that just as for many employees a duty of
loyalty would have “little practical application,”100 so too would duties
of performance because so little of significance might escape the monitoring to which many rank-and-file employees are subject in performing work that does not require exercising discretion. Moreover, for
both types of duties and for many employees, recourse to litigation
and remedies outside the workplace would not be typical.101
In contrast, the Agency Restatement, by characterizing all employees as agents, subjects all of them to fiduciary duties. Relatively
recent cases from different jurisdictions support its solution, while
others support the solution in the Restatement.102 Like the Agency
Restatement, courts characterizing employees as agent fiduciaries
counsel caution, noting the varied contexts in which claims of disloyalty may arise and the context-specific scope of the duty of loyalty that
an employee owes an employer.103 And some courts acknowledge
that some claims of breach of fiduciary duty require the application of
“rules of reason”104 and not application in a mechanical or “nonsensical, Stalinist way.”105
99

RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 cmt. b (2015).
Id. § 8.01 cmt. a.
101
Id. § 8.01 cmt. e (“Employers typically enforce the duty of loyalty through legitimate workplace discipline, including termination of employment.”).
102
Compare, e.g., TalentBurst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (D. Mass.
2008) (applying Massachusetts law and finding that duty of loyalty does not extend to rankand-file employee in absence of special circumstances indicating a relationship of trust and
confidence), with Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 617, 667 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (applying Pennsylvania law and finding that employee, as agent of employer, owes
employer a duty of loyalty).
103
See Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789–90 (N.J. 1999) (discussing the
scope of employer-employee duties); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c
(2006) (observing that fiduciary obligation does not operate monolithically).
104
Cameco, 724 A.2d at 789.
105
See Seibold v. Camulos Partners LP, C.A. No. 5176-CS, 2012 WL 4076182, at * 21
(Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2012). In Seibold, a hedge fund’s former partner/senior analyst
100
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B. Relationships of Trust and Confidence
The Restatement’s criteria specifying which employees occupy
positions of trust and confidence unquestionably capture the most obvious candidates: employees who “exercise substantial discretion and
are not subject to close supervision” in discharging “managerial, supervisory, professional, or similar highly skilled work responsibilities”106 for the employer or have substantial discretion and little direct
oversight in carrying out their tasks, especially when they have been
“entrusted with . . . the employer’s trade secrets.”107 Prototypes coming immediately to mind are senior executive officers of public companies,108 nonofficer employees who negotiate transactions on their
employer’s behalf, and employees who work as investment bankers or
securities brokers.
However, employees may occupy positions of trust and confidence outside these transactional and C-suite prototypes although
breached his fiduciary duty by, inter alia, downloading massive amounts of a fund’s work
product to create a resource for competing with the fund. See id. Although by taking work
product for his own purposes, the former partner/senior analyst breached fiduciary duty,
see id., the court noted that the principle stated in Restatement (Third) of Agency section
8.05 “should not be read in a nonsensical, Stalinist way that allows employers an easy excuse to penalize employees for human behavior that does not diminish the effectiveness of
the employer in any way.” Id. n. 207. In particular, Seibold notes that employees often
make incidental use of employer property—like computers—for their own purposes,
“[b]ut so too do employees’ own computers, paper, and resources get used for work benefiting their employers.” Id.
106
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 cmt. a (2015). The predecessor formulation in
the Proposed Final Draft encompassed employees who exercised “managerial responsibilities” or had “substantial discretion and little direct oversight in carrying out their tasks, and
especially when they have been entrusted with the employer’s trade secrets.” Proposed
Final Draft § 8.01 cmt. a.
107
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 cmt. a (2015). The Restatement does not explore whether the term “relationship of trust and confidence” means different things in
different contexts. For example, the ALI’s ongoing project on economic torts states that
failing to disclose a material fact constitutes fraud when an actor has a duty to speak, which
includes an “actor . . . in a fiduciary or confidential relationship with another that obliges
the actor to make disclosures.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM
§ 13(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014). Confidential relationships “arise when one party is
bound to act in good faith for the benefit of the other because they have a relationship of
trust; typically one of the parties has gained a position of substantial influence over the
other.” Id. § 13(b) cmt. c. Although this formulation is descriptive, not analytic, its criterion of “substantial influence over the other” is not on all fours with the criteria in the
Restatement. Nor does the Restatement explore the situation of employees who fall
outside the trust-and-confidence criteria but have power to bind the employer to contracts
with third parties, that is, to act as agents.
108
Not all officers may be employees, at least for all purposes, but they are agents of
the entity. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. e (2006). Although the Model
Business Corporation Act defines an officer to be an employee, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 1.40(8) (2008), not all business-organization statutes follow this approach. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2013) (“Every corporation organized under this chapter shall
have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors . . . .”).
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their roles are nonmanagerial and their work is more susceptible to
monitoring by the employer. For example, a well-developed group of
cases stem from alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by law firm associates—not typically the occupants of managerial roles within law
firms—who refer potential clients elsewhere109 or jumpstart competitive activities before leaving their present employer.110 Most associates, however, do at least some work without much “close supervision,”
including work that brings them into contact with clients of the firm
or information furnished by clients or developed for them.
But the range of employees in whom trust is necessarily reposed
often reaches more widely. Recall Collin O’Neil’s hypothetical
figures, Sue and Bob, and assume that Sue is a commercially successful author who employs Bob as her assistant and, somewhat obsessively, checks frequently to determine how Bob’s work is
progressing.111 Depending on the specific work assigned to Bob, and
notwithstanding Sue’s monitoring, Bob may learn a great deal about
Sue, including information not protectable as a trade secret.112 In the
original hypothetical, at a minimum Bob knows that a valuable asset
belonging to Sue—her laptop—has sustained major damage due to
his carelessness.113 Not only would Sue be justified in trusting Bob
not to try to exculpate himself by framing her cat, Sue would also be
justified in trusting Bob not to use this information for purposes other
than her own. Returning to the law firm context, the firm likewise is
justified in trusting that its cohort of employees whose work is restricted to data-entry or document-review tasks would keep confidential the information to which their work necessarily exposes them, an
expectation accentuated by the firm’s duties of confidentiality to its
own clients. Moreover, if those employees trade in securities on the
basis of nonpublic material information gleaned from their work, or

109
See, e.g., Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 463–64 (Tex. App.
2005) (stating facts of case where an attorney referred clients to competing firm).
110
See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1271 (Mass. 1989) (noting that
attorneys removed cases from their departing firm).
111
In some industries, employers adopt compliance measures that involve real-time
monitoring of employee activity, including that of employees who appear to fit within prototypical trust-and-confidence categories. For an extreme example from the hedge-fund
sphere, see William Alden, Bridgewater’s Ray Dalio Says Taping Employees Has Legal Benefits,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:43 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/bridge
waters-ray-dalio-says-taping-employees-has-legal-benefits/. The Restatement does not address how to categorize an intensely supervised employee who exercises substantial
discretion.
112
This might include her travel plans, financial resources, status of works-in-progress,
and relationships with publishers and editors, etc.
113
See O’Neil, supra note 17, at 302.
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tip the information to others for trading purposes, they are subject to
liability despite the routinized nature of their work.114
Whether the parties to a relationship must mutually understand it
as one of trust and confidence is open to question, but the Restatement does not address this question. As the court formulated the definition of relationships of trust and confidence in Burdett v. Miller,
what mattered was whether the defendant solicited the plaintiff’s trust
in his expertise and trustworthiness, not whether he shared the plaintiff’s perception of himself or harbored intentions consistent with his
external guise.115 In even more extreme cases, an actor’s self-understanding of an assumed role and its character may be completely at
odds with an intentionally created appearance, as when an actor infiltrates a business firm or other organization in the guise of an employee to obtain information to be used in ways the employer would
not wish.116 For example, in Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, the defendant undertook the role of an
unpaid intern to enable him to surreptitiously remove documents and
make videos intercepting conversations from the plaintiff’s premises,
all to supplement a documentary film sponsored by an ideological opponent of the plaintiff.117 The infiltrated organization sued alleging
that the interceptions violated federal and local wiretap statutes,
which prohibit intentional interceptions of oral communications; an
interception to which one party consents (as did the infiltrator posing
as an intern) violates these statutes if done for the purpose of committing “any criminal or tortious act.”118 The Gaubatz court, treating a
breach of fiduciary duty as a tortious act for this purpose, held that
the question was whether the intern “understood himself as bound by
a fiduciary duty of non-disclosure” to the organization, to be determined by the trier of fact.119 On the one hand, personnel within the
organization never explicitly discussed duties of confidentiality and
the intern never signed and returned the confidentiality agreement
he was given; on the other hand, evidence in the record suggested the
114
See, e.g., Christopher M. Matthews, Law-Firm Employee Charged with Insider Trading,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/law-firm-employeecharged-with-insider-trading-1410898540 (describing a case where a “back-office employee” was charged with trading on inside information that he found on the firm’s
systems).
115
957 F.2d 1375, 1381–82 (7th Cir. 1992).
116
See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (M.D.N.C.
1996). But see Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 709 (N.C. 2001) (repudiating Food Lion as a
statement of state law to the extent it can be read to support an independent claim for
breach of fiduciary duty).
117
31 F. Supp. 3d 237, 244–45 (D.D.C. 2014).
118
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2012); D.C. CODE § 23-542(b)(3) (2013).
119
31 F. Supp. 3d at 262.
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intern actively elicited the organization’s trust in him.120 The approach in Burdett is preferable: by deliberately creating a guise to
evoke others’ trust, a poseur like the defendant in Gaubatz should be
subject to duties consistent with the guise. This is because posing as a
person in whom trust can safely be reposed predictably leads to
changes in the conduct of other actors.121
III
IMPLICATIONS
A. Contractualization and Its Limits
One foreseeable implication of requiring a relationship of trust
and confidence to trigger the imposition of fiduciary duties on employees is self-help by employers. That is, employers may find it attractive to use individual employment agreements explicitly stating that
the employer and the employee wish to form a relationship of trust
and confidence. The Restatement does not include a general principle against which to assess the effect of employers’ statements purporting to characterize the relationship or to impose duties on employees,
whether made through individual employment agreements or
through unilateral declarations by the employer. Moreover, the Restatement overall is not consistent in how it treats the significance of
contract law in connection with employment relationships. The Restatement’s initial section defining the conditions for the existence of
an employment relationship, although stating that an individual renders services as an employee only when “the employer consents to receive the individual’s services,”122 does not require either an express
agreement or a contract linking that individual and the employer. In
contrast, a later section focused on contract-law issues in the employment context states in comment that “[a]t its core, employment is a
contractual relationship.”123 But under the Restatement’s basic definition of an employment relationship, the “core” is consent, not
contract.124
In less general terms, the Restatement clarifies that an employer’s
unilateral statements purporting to impose obligations on employees,
in contrast to individualized agreements, are not likely to be enforceable extramurally—that is, other than through the employer’s power to
120

See id. at 248, 258.
For further elaboration, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Poseur as Agent, in AGENCY LAW
IN COMMERCIAL PRACTICE (Danny Busch et al. eds., forthcoming 2015).
122
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01(a)(2) (2015).
123
Id. § 2.01 cmt. b.
124
Likewise, a relationship of common-law agency does not necessarily involve a contract between agent and principal. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. d
(2006).
121
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discipline an employee or terminate employment.125 Although the
Restatement addresses agreements with individual employees that restrict their rights to compete postemployment126 and agreements
geared to protect trade secrets,127 and states limits on the effectiveness
of such agreements, it does not explore the impact of agreements that
designate employment relationships as ones of trust and confidence.
An obvious question is whether such an agreement is dispositive if, for
example, an employee’s conduct would constitute a breach of the
duty of loyalty but the employee falls outside the Restatement’s definition of a relationship of trust and confidence.128 If the term in the
agreement is not dispositive, who bears the burden of alleging and
proving that the employee does or does not meet the definitional criteria? Elsewhere, in defining an employment relationship, the Restatement provides that designations or characterizations in an
agreement or an employer policy statement are not controlling.129
Left open is the status of provisions designating the character of a
relationship that is uncontrovertibly one of employment.
More generally, contractualized solutions to fiduciary-duty
problems are not problem free. One risk is that a “trust and confidence/loyalty” agreement would be yet another form to be signed and
filed away in the employer’s human resources department without
having engaged the attention of many employees. Additionally, such
an agreement may prove to be incomplete because human cognition
is limited in its powers of foresight. Reflecting recently on Delaware’s
experience with contractualization in connection with governance arrangements for business entities, two distinguished judges were skeptical that drafters of the governing instruments were likely to succeed
“in attempting to provide contractually for all reasonably conceivable
circumstances.”130 Statutes in Delaware permit the organizational
documents for partnerships and limited liability companies (but not
corporations) to vary or eliminate fiduciary duties otherwise owed by
the entity’s managers to the entity and its members.131 To the au125
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 cmt. a (2015). No remedy for employees’
breaches of duty is keyed to breach of a duty purportedly imposed in a unilateral employer
policy statement.
126
Id. § 8.06.
127
Id. § 8.07(b)(i) (stating employer’s legitimate interest in protecting its “trade
secrets . . . and other protectable confidential information that does not meet the statutory
definition of trade secret”).
128
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
129
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. g (2015); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.02 (2006).
130
Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom, in
HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE ENTITIES (Mark Lowenstein & Robert Hillman eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 12), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481039.
131
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (2013) (partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (limited
liability companies).
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thors, who adjudicated many cases involving contractualized governance provisions, “[t]he difficulties drafters have in substituting their
own bespoke provisions for the equitable principles that have been
forged by cases over centuries should not be surprising.”132 To be
sure, governance arrangements for entities are more complex and,
one assumes, harder to specify in advance than the duties owed by an
employee, and thus the Delaware experience with alternate-entity governance may seem inapposite. Nonetheless, it suggests caution in assuming that provisions in individual employment agreements would
replace conventional fiduciary duties in an entirely satisfactory way.
B. Duties of Loyalty and Duties of Disclosure
Under formulations of the Restatement, unless a specific agreement so requires, employees not subject to fiduciary duties do not
have duties of disclosure to their employers, including the duty to furnish material information to the employer.133 And, again in the absence of an agreement providing otherwise, an employee who is not
subject to a duty of loyalty may work for a competitor of the employer
subject to stated limitations.134 Moonlighting—an economic necessity
for many employees—breaches an employee’s duties when the employee works for a competing employer during time committed to the
first employer, uses or discloses the first employer’s trade secrets, or
injures the first employer “to any greater extent than would any other
individual working for the competitor.”135 Requiring that restrictions
on moonlighting be imposed through an explicit agreement seems
attractive because it places employees on notice—indeed, more effectively than would a statement deeming their relationship with the employer to be one of trust and confidence—of particular forms of
conduct that the employer disallows. However, absent such an agreement, an employee not in a relationship of trust and confidence owes
no duty to the employer to notify the employer about the moonlighting; the employer may have a different perspective on how injurious

132
Strine, Jr. & Laster, supra note 130. The difficulties are not surprising because the
“equitable principles emerged in large measure to address the situations involving the exercise of authority by one person over another’s property that could not be effectively
addressed by contracting.” Id.
133
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(a) (2015).
134
Id. § 8.04(c). Comment b states that “[a]n employer wishing to restrict moonlighting . . . must, in the typical case, obtain an enforceable agreement . . . or promulgate a
reasonable workplace policy against such ‘moonlighting.’” Id. § 8.04 cmt. b. However,
unilaterally promulgated employer policy statements “do not provide an independent basis
for imposing liability on the employee.” Id. § 2.05 cmt. a.
135
Id. § 8.04 cmt. b.
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the employee’s work for its competitor may prove to be.136 Like the
Restatement’s restriction of fiduciary duties to employees who occupy
relationships of trust and confidence, the absence of duties of disclosure may reflect an assumption that many employees have no information of material interest to furnish to their employers, so narrowly
defined are their roles.137 How well this assumption applies in an increasingly knowledge-based economy in which business firms choose
less hierarchical organizational structures is open to question. And it
leaves one wondering why employees as a group are categorically so
different from the hypothetical Bob, who not only attempts to frame
the cat but, more generally, withholds material information from Sue,
who trusts him.138
CONCLUSION
There is much to applaud about the Restatement of Employment
Law. It represents the culmination of a long process of active debate
and achieves a focused statement of legal principles applicable to an
important type of relationship. Although its answer to the question of
employees’ fiduciary duties is attractive in many respects, the answer is
complicated and comes with drawbacks. Additionally, the focused nature of the project itself may have inhibited the Restatement’s engagement with broader questions. As this Essay demonstrates, fiduciary
duties imposed on an ad hoc basis, triggered by finding a relationship
of trust and confidence, resist generalization but tend to stem from
inquiries at the periphery of categorically established fiduciary relationships. It muddies an already complex concept to require a factspecific basis for the imposition of fiduciary duty that is geared to a
categorically defined relationship,139 employment. Additionally, the
Restatement leaves many questions open and does not address instances in which well-established bodies of law—like that proscribing
insider trading—seem at odds with the Restatement’s formulations.
More generally, the Restatement does not resolve the status of contract within employment law nor, more narrowly, the significance to
be given to provisions in individual employment agreements and employers’ unilateral declarations that purport to characterize the nature
136
See Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999) (“To an employee, the
possibility of conflict with the employer’s interest may seem remote; to the employer, the
possibility may seem more immediate.”).
137
See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
138
See O’Neil, supra note 17, at 302.
139
See United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 729–30 (9th Cir. 2012) (Clifton, J.,
concurring) (stating that, in the mail-fraud context, “we should not muddy the meaning of
‘fiduciary’ any further by employing it here to mean something other than ‘fiduciary’”).
Additional confusion may stem from the Restatement’s shifts in focus from fiduciary relationships to fiduciary duties owed by actors who are not otherwise deemed to be
fiduciaries.
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or quality of the relationship. Combining the complexity of trust-andconfidence determinations with these omissions may leave courts with
little guidance.
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